Seeded randomness extractors#

We define a seeded randomness extractor as a function

\[\text{Ext}\,:\,\{0,1\}^n\times\{0,1\}^d\rightarrow\{0,1\}^m\]

that takes a weak random source \(X\), a bit string of length \(n\), and a uniform seed \(Y\), a bit string of length \(d\), and outputs \(\text{Ext}(X,Y)\), a bit string of length \(m\) that is almost uniform, given that the original string had sufficiently high entropy.

Notation

Throughout this documentation we use the letters \(X\), \(Y\) and \(Z\) to denote classical random variables, while other letters like \(A\), \(B\) or \(E\) denote quantum information.

Here the term “almost uniform” refers to the statistical distance with respect to the uniform probability distribution. In particular, if the output of the extractor is characterized by the probability distribution \(P_Z\), and \(U_Z\) denotes the uniform probability distribution1Remember that in a uniform probability distribution each event is equally likely., we say that the output of the extractor is \(\epsilon\)-close to uniform if

\[\frac{1}{2}\sum_{z\in\{0,1\}^m} \left|p_Z(z)-U_Z(z)\right|=\frac{1}{2} \sum_{z\in\{0,1\}^m} \left|p_Z(z)-\frac{1}{2^m}\right|\leq \epsilon\;.\]

Since we will be working with quantum side information, it will be convenient to express this statistical distance in terms of the trace distance between two quantum states.2Any classical information, like our bit strings, can be expressed as a diagonal density matrix operator using the formalism of Quantum Information Theory. For more details about this, you can check any textbook about Quantum Information Theory such as this one [3] or this more recent one [4]. In particular, if we denote \(\rho_{\text{Ext}(X,Y)}\) the state representing the output of the extractor, and \(\sigma_U\) is the fully mixed state on a system of dimension \(2^m\), then the previous equation is equivalent to

\[d(\rho_{\text{Ext}(X,Y)}, \sigma_U):=\frac{1}{2}\|\rho_{\text{Ext}(X,Y)}-\sigma_U\|_\text{tr}\leq\epsilon\,,\]

where \(\|A\|_\text{tr}:=\text{tr}\sqrt{A^\dagger A}\) is the trace norm.

We say that an extractor is strong if the output is independent of the seed \(Y\). This can be enforced by adding the seed to the trace distance condition

\[d(\rho_{\text{Ext}(X,Y)Y}, \sigma_U):=\frac{1}{2}\|\rho_{\text{Ext}(X,Y)}-\sigma_U\otimes\rho_Y\|_\text{tr}\leq\epsilon\,.\]

This allows to extract randomness even if the seed becomes known to an adversary, such as in QKD.

With all this information we are ready to define strong randomness extractors. The only missing part is introducing a new parameter \(k\), which will bound how bad (or good) the weak random source actually is.3To understand why this is important, you can think of the extreme case where the weak random source always outputs the all-zeros (or all-ones) \(n\)-bit string. It is not possible to extract any randomness from this source since there is no randomness at all. This should be taken into account in the definition of a randomness extractor. This parameter governs how long the resulting string can be or, in oder words, how much the input needs to be compressed. Intuitively, one has to “pay” a price for improving the randomness: a shorter output length.

The correct information-theoretic measure for this is the min-entropy, which is directly related to the guessing probability

\[\text{H}_\text{min}(X):=-\log \max_x p_X(x)=:-\log p_\text{guess}\,.\]

This definition is classical because it only involves the classical random variable \(X\). Later, we will generalize this definition to include the fact that an adversary may have some side-information about \(X\) and this information may be quantum.

Strong randomness extractor#

We define a \((k,\epsilon)\)-strong randomness extractor as a function

\[\text{Ext}\,:\,\{0,1\}^n\times\{0,1\}^d\rightarrow\{0,1\}^m\]

that outputs an \(m\)-bit bit string that is \(\epsilon\)-close from the ideal output, a uniform \(m\)-bit string independent of the seed \(Y\), as long as this seed is uniform and the min-entropy of the weak random source \(X\) is lower bounded \(H_\text{min}(X)\geq k\).

Quantum-proof strong randomness extractor#

When considering adversarial scenarios, we must take into account the side-information that an adversary may have about the weak random source since this knowledge affects the guessing probability. Randomness extractors that are useful even when an adversary has classical side-information are called classical-proof extractors. If they can also be used when the side-information is quantum, then they are called quantum-proof extractors.

To properly define quantum-proof strong extractors we have to introduce the conditional min-entropy.

\[H_\text{min}(X|E):=-\log \sum_x p_X(x)\text{tr}\left[\rho_x E_x\right]=:-\log p_\text{guess}\,.\]

Let’s go through this new expression in detail. The quantum side-information is denoted by the system \(E\). The best an attacker can do to learn the value \(x\) of the random variable \(X\) is measuring this system with an optimal measurement, which mathematically we denote with the POVM4A POVM, or positive operator-valued measurement, is the most general description of a quantum measurement. \(\{E_x\}_x\), and make a guess based on the outcome of this measurement. For each possible value \(x\), the side-information is in some conditional state \(\rho_x\). The measurement postulate of quantum mechanics tells us how to calculate the probability of getting the correct guess for each \(x\).

\[p_\text{correct guess}=\text{tr}\left[\rho_x E_x\right]\,.\]

Finally, we average over all possible values of \(X\) to get the new guessing probability

\[p_\text{guess}:=\sum_x p_X(x)\text{tr}\left[\rho_x E_x\right]\,.\]

We define a quantum-proof \((k,\epsilon)\)-strong randomness extractor as a function

\[\text{Ext}\,:\,\{0,1\}^n\times\{0,1\}^d\rightarrow\{0,1\}^m\,,\]

whose output is \(\epsilon\)-close to the ideal output in terms of the trace distance

\[\frac{1}{2}\|\rho_{\text{Ext}(X,Y)YE}-\sigma_{U}\otimes\rho_Y\otimes\rho_E\|_\text{tr}\leq\epsilon\,,\]

as long as the seed \(Y\) is uniform and the conditional min-entropy of the weak random source is lower bounded by \(H_\text{min}(X|E)\geq k\).

Quantum-proof strong randomness extractors are also classical-proof, and, for course, also satisfy the definition of strong randomness extractors without side-information. They are the correct extractors for applications where an attacker may be quantum such as in QKD and QRNG.